Hardware Bound

Hardware-bound vault

A copied vault file should not open on someone else's device. BlindLock is built around that rule.

File

The vault sits inside an ordinary-looking PNG file.

Password

To sign you in, BlindLock also asks for your master password.

Device

The key depends on your device's security chip and a server release. On other hardware, the vault stays closed.

What hardware-bound means

BlindLock uses platform security hardware — TPM 2.0 on Windows and Linux, Secure Enclave on macOS. A copied carrier is not enough. The key to your login image depends on your device's security chip and a release from the BlindLock licence server. To sign you in, BlindLock also asks for your PIN and your master password.

Optional hardware key

If you want, activate a physical hardware key — a modern FIDO2 key that supports sealing, for example a YubiKey 5, a current Google Titan key, or a SoloKey. Once activated, the key cryptographically seals your access. Without it the vault can no longer be unlocked. Your twelve words remain as the fallback.

Limits

Hardware binding protects the vault at rest. It does not replace operating-system hygiene and does not stop a keylogger on a computer that is already compromised.

Why device binding changes the picture

A conventional local vault can often be copied and attacked offline with only the vault file and master password. BlindLock adds an independent device factor. Part of the unlocking key is sealed by your device's security chip and only opens on that device. A copy of the carrier file therefore holds nothing but hardware-bound, encrypted content. Without that specific device, a piece of the key is missing, and the vault stays shut. Even if someone copies your PNG carrier from a backup or cloud-synchronised folder, the file alone is not enough: on unauthorised hardware the part of the key that your security chip keeps sealed is missing, and the master password cannot make up for it. That adds an independent barrier instead of simply placing another password at the door.

What comes together to open it

  • File. The carrier file, an unremarkable PNG, holds the encrypted vault. Without it there is nothing to open.
  • Password. BlindLock checks your master password on every sign-in with Argon2id, using 1 to 4 GB of memory per try depending on the device. It never leaves your device.
  • Device and server. One part of the key, kept sealed by TPM 2.0 or Secure Enclave, only opens on this device. A release from the BlindLock licence server comes on top. To sign you in, BlindLock also asks for your PIN. The key itself depends on the device and the server release. A copied file alone is not enough.

Optional: hardware key

  • On the desktop you can activate a hardware key — it cryptographically seals your access.
  • Supported are modern FIDO2 keys with sealing capability (hmac-secret), for example YubiKey 5, current Google Titan keys, and SoloKeys. Keys without this capability are rejected during activation.
  • With the key active, normal unlock requires the key to be connected and confirmed. Recovery instead requires the encrypted BlindLock backup and separately stored twelve words.
  • The key is an additional hurdle, not a replacement for device binding. The two work together.

Who it is for

  • People who keep high-value credentials or recovery material and have to assume that files will eventually end up in the wrong hands.
  • Users who deliberately keep their vault file in backups or across several drives, without any single copy becoming a liability.
  • Anyone who wants a password store with no central vault account, no automatic cloud sync and no provider-side customer-vault database.

Who it is not for

  • Teams that want a vault kept automatically in sync across many rotating devices. One licence activates exactly one device.
  • Anyone who regularly works on borrowed, unconfigured machines and expects instant full access there. Device binding deliberately prevents that.
  • Anyone expecting a tool that secures a system already infected with malware. No vault software can do that.

A concrete scenario

Picture an old backup drive falling into the wrong hands. Among hundreds of holiday photos sits the PNG file that holds your BlindLock vault. The finder has no obvious reason to take it for a vault: it has no telling extension and no obvious BlindLock marker. Even if they identify it and know your password, their machine is missing the part of the key that your security chip keeps sealed. The content remains encrypted, and the copied file alone cannot be unlocked. On your authorised device, BlindLock opens the vault as usual with your PIN and master password, provided that no optional hardware key has also been set up.

What BlindLock does not claim here

Device binding is an extra, honest hurdle, not a magic lock. It protects the vault at rest and makes copied files insufficient on unauthorised hardware. It does not replace a well-maintained operating system, a strong device sign-in or careful storage of your twelve words. On a computer already taken over by malware, even the best vault can be compromised at the moment you unlock it. I do not promise absolute invulnerability. I add an independent barrier and remove the classic weak point where one file plus one password opens everywhere.

Frequently asked questions

What happens if my device breaks or is lost?

Restoration on a new device requires an encrypted BlindLock backup and your twelve words. Keep them securely and separately. Neither is sufficient on its own.

Can I open the same vault on two computers?

Not automatically on two desktops. The binding is per device, and one paid Lifetime licence activates exactly one Windows, macOS or Linux device. Simultaneous use on a second desktop needs another licence and its own hardware binding. Your entries move with an encrypted BlindLock backup and the twelve words, the licence moves with the built-in migration. iOS, iPadOS and Android follow free of charge.

Do I have to use a hardware key?

No. Device binding, server release, PIN and master password stand on their own. The hardware key is an optional extra hurdle for anyone who wants an extra physical confirmation.

Related guides

Keep reading.

Each guide covers one layer of the local vault model.