File
The vault sits inside an ordinary-looking PNG file.
A copied vault file should not open on someone else's device. BlindLock is built around that rule.
The vault sits inside an ordinary-looking PNG file.
To sign you in, BlindLock also asks for your master password.
The key depends on your device's security chip and a server release. On other hardware, the vault stays closed.
BlindLock uses platform security hardware — TPM 2.0 on Windows and Linux, Secure Enclave on macOS. A copied carrier is not enough. The key to your login image depends on your device's security chip and a release from the BlindLock licence server. To sign you in, BlindLock also asks for your PIN and your master password.
If you want, activate a physical hardware key — a modern FIDO2 key that supports sealing, for example a YubiKey 5, a current Google Titan key, or a SoloKey. Once activated, the key cryptographically seals your access. Without it the vault can no longer be unlocked. Your twelve words remain as the fallback.
Hardware binding protects the vault at rest. It does not replace operating-system hygiene and does not stop a keylogger on a computer that is already compromised.
A conventional local vault can often be copied and attacked offline with only the vault file and master password. BlindLock adds an independent device factor. Part of the unlocking key is sealed by your device's security chip and only opens on that device. A copy of the carrier file therefore holds nothing but hardware-bound, encrypted content. Without that specific device, a piece of the key is missing, and the vault stays shut. Even if someone copies your PNG carrier from a backup or cloud-synchronised folder, the file alone is not enough: on unauthorised hardware the part of the key that your security chip keeps sealed is missing, and the master password cannot make up for it. That adds an independent barrier instead of simply placing another password at the door.
Picture an old backup drive falling into the wrong hands. Among hundreds of holiday photos sits the PNG file that holds your BlindLock vault. The finder has no obvious reason to take it for a vault: it has no telling extension and no obvious BlindLock marker. Even if they identify it and know your password, their machine is missing the part of the key that your security chip keeps sealed. The content remains encrypted, and the copied file alone cannot be unlocked. On your authorised device, BlindLock opens the vault as usual with your PIN and master password, provided that no optional hardware key has also been set up.
Device binding is an extra, honest hurdle, not a magic lock. It protects the vault at rest and makes copied files insufficient on unauthorised hardware. It does not replace a well-maintained operating system, a strong device sign-in or careful storage of your twelve words. On a computer already taken over by malware, even the best vault can be compromised at the moment you unlock it. I do not promise absolute invulnerability. I add an independent barrier and remove the classic weak point where one file plus one password opens everywhere.
Restoration on a new device requires an encrypted BlindLock backup and your twelve words. Keep them securely and separately. Neither is sufficient on its own.
Not automatically on two desktops. The binding is per device, and one paid Lifetime licence activates exactly one Windows, macOS or Linux device. Simultaneous use on a second desktop needs another licence and its own hardware binding. Your entries move with an encrypted BlindLock backup and the twelve words, the licence moves with the built-in migration. iOS, iPadOS and Android follow free of charge.
No. Device binding, server release, PIN and master password stand on their own. The hardware key is an optional extra hurdle for anyone who wants an extra physical confirmation.
Each guide covers one layer of the local vault model.