No central collection
Your password vault stays encrypted inside a PNG carrier on your device. Larger files use separate encrypted file-vault containers.
A cloud vault is convenient, but it creates a central place where encrypted customer vaults can be collected. BlindLock uses a different model: no central customer-vault database, no automatic vault sync and no BlindLock cloud account for storing your secrets.
Your password vault stays encrypted inside a PNG carrier on your device. Larger files use separate encrypted file-vault containers.
The key depends on your device's security chip and a release from the licence server. A copy alone is not enough.
You can also require a hardware key such as YubiKey, Google Titan or SoloKey.
BlindLock does not replace operating-system hygiene and cannot protect a fully compromised computer during an active session. It reduces the cloud attack vector and binds the vault to your device.
A central cloud vault gathers the encrypted data of many people in one place. That is attractive to attackers, because a single successful breach at the provider reaches a large number of users at once. Recent years have shown that even large, carefully run providers can become the target of such incidents. And once an encrypted vault has been copied, an attacker has unlimited time to try the master password offline.
BlindLock inverts that logic. There is no central collection point containing customer vaults because BlindLock servers never receive them. A provider breach therefore cannot expose a mass collection of vault contents that I do not possess. If someone obtains your carrier file, they still lack the security chip of the authorised device (TPM 2.0 or Secure Enclave) and the release from the licence server. To sign you in, BlindLock also asks for your PIN and your master password.
Imagine a well-known cloud password service announces an incident: backup copies of encrypted vaults were taken. Customers now have to assume their vault is in someone else's hands and rotate every important password under time pressure.
BlindLock removes the central customer-vault store from that scenario. Your carrier sits where you place it, and a copied file alone does not grant access: the security chip of your device and the release from the licence server are still missing. This is not a guarantee against every conceivable attack, but it removes an entire class of risk from the picture up front.
You create and store the vault locally. Opening it needs your device and a release from the licence server, and BlindLock also asks for your master password. A licence and version check occurs at unlock, but there is no BlindLock cloud account or server-side customer vault.
You control the vault and its storage. There is no server-side customer vault or BlindLock cloud account holding its contents. You decide whether to export data or place an encrypted backup in a cloud-synchronised folder.
Back up the active carrier. For migration and emergencies, also create an encrypted BlindLock backup and keep its twelve words separately. For file vaults, also keep the vault file. On another device it opens with your vault password, your backup file and your twelve words. One licence activates one device at a time.
Each guide covers one layer of the local vault model.
If you are looking for a vault without the cloud, review the security architecture — Lifetime licences are available now on the pricing page.